



Director of
Central
Intelligence

National Intelligence Council

Threat Outlook

**New Problems That May Arise
for the US Government in
Ongoing World Trouble
Spots in Months Ahead**

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New Problems That May Arise for the US Government in Ongoing World Trouble Spots in Months Ahead

This report focuses especially on those ongoing major trouble spots where there is greatest reasonable chance over the next few months that various US adversaries might seek to exploit those situations—in the belief that constraints attending our election period might complicate effective US policy response to those situations, and so improve the longer term positions there of the USSR, Cuba, or other adversaries. This report also briefly specifies other troubles which may arise in any event during the US election period. The list of cases discussed in this report purposely excludes the many world crises which might arise but either are unlikely to occur, or would not necessarily be of profound significance for US interests if they did. Those potential new problems discussed below will be given especially close scrutiny by the Intelligence Community in coming weeks to allow detection and alerts as early as possible.

[redacted] we consider that the USSR is not prepared to provoke extreme confrontations, but is interested through less risky actions in exploiting near-term opportunities. The Soviet hand will in some instances be direct. In others, the chief actor will be Cuba or some other adversary, with the Soviet role backstage or minimal. And, still other new troubles can develop on their own.

The most likely threat in coming weeks remains a fall offensive by the Salvadoran insurgents.

Difficult problems will arise if Nicaragua receives jet combat aircraft (L-39s) from Libya:

- At least 35 [redacted] Nicaraguan pilots who have received MIG-21 training in Cuba and the Soviet Bloc have [redacted] completed that training and returned home.
- Libya may soon deliver five Czechoslovak L-39 Albatros jet trainers to Nicaragua via Bulgaria. These are the aircraft that

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pilots train on before they graduate to MIGs, although L-39s can be fitted to perform ground attack and other combat roles. The Libyans tried to send an L-39 so configured to Nicaragua in [REDACTED] in November 1983; but that shipment was intercepted by the Brazilians.

- The L-39 is not supersonic and is not primarily a combat aircraft. But when fitted with bombs, rockets, and the 23-mm cannon, it is [REDACTED] a good weapon for counterinsurgency operations.

If the shipment departs soon, it could arrive in Nicaragua around mid-August. Meanwhile, the main runway of the large new military airfield at Punta Huete probably will be completed [REDACTED] before the reported October deadline.

- Moscow almost certainly is at least aware of these developments. By sponsoring or winking at the deployment of L-39s in Nicaragua, the Soviets are testing what the traffic will bear. Their belief that the unique nature of these aircraft makes them an ambiguous case for the US Government to counter, in contrast to [REDACTED] MIGs; that US interests might suffer whether the US response to [REDACTED] the L-39s were mild or strong.

The most difficult new problems that are likely to face the US Government between now and the end of the year, however, arise from heightened Soviet and Indian pressures against Pakistan.

- Even now both Moscow and New Delhi are exerting increased pressures against Pakistan. These will almost certainly increase in [REDACTED] coming weeks.

[REDACTED]
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
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- The Soviet and Indian pressures are separately driven, but converge in certain respects.

The Soviets are increasingly frustrated over Afghanistan, want to end Pakistani assistance to resistance groups there, and seem to be searching for some new means of effecting this.


The Indians are especially concerned about Pakistan's nuclear program. They are uneasy over the growth of Pakistan's US-supported overall military strength. They see the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan as the primary cause of vastly increased Western economic and military support to Pakistan.

The Soviets and the Indians share a desire to bring Zia down.

We know that the Soviets are attempting to heighten Indian concerns over Pakistan. Also, that the Soviets seek [redacted] subversive attempts to destabilize Pakistan.

- These Indian and Soviet pressures against Pakistan do not spring principally from desires to embarrass the US Government.

Moscow's leaders nonetheless doubtless believe that heightened pressures against Pakistan will make it difficult for the United



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States to frustrate Soviet and Indian efforts to unseat Zia. In the Soviet view, Pakistan is far from the United States; Moscow's hand could be somewhat hidden in certain cases, and US concerns over nuclear proliferation might create some ambivalence in Washington in the event Indian military action against Pakistan

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- For their part, the Pakistanis are being careful not to provoke Moscow, although they will doubtless continue to hang tough regarding Afghanistan. Pakistani capabilities to counter Soviet, "Afghan," or Indian air attacks would be good if they had advance warning.

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There are certain other situations that are somewhat less likely to develop than the above, but cannot be excluded and could be of considerable significance to US interests should they arise. The chief such cases:

Escalation of Soviet pressures on Berlin:

- At the present time Moscow is taking certain harassing measures possibly designed to remind the United States and the Europeans (including the German Democratic Republic) of Soviet leverage over the existence of tranquillity in Central Europe. These harassments concern the air corridors and ground traffic, and access to certain Permanently Restricted Areas (on the ground) in East Germany.
- Any more intense pressures would almost certainly be applied gradually, however, and with care to test Western reactions at relatively low risk.

An expanded Persian Gulf crisis:

- The most likely source of new trouble would be Iraqi attacks in the Gulf which substantially reduced Iranian oil production, followed by Iranian reprisal attacks on key oil facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
- Free world oil supplies could suffer, but only if such Iranian attacks succeeded in sharply curtailing Saudi oil production.

An attempt by Cuban-sponsored leftists to gain primary influence in Bolivia:

- Pro-Cuban elements continue to gain influence in President Siles' political party and in Bolivia's Ministry of Interior. They might attempt to seize predominant power in coming months.

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- It is more likely, however, that they will continue to play it cool. They are aware of the superior power of the conservative military, and of the prospect of possibly greatly increasing pro-Cuban influence through more measured action over the longer run.

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